EU-Japan / Fight against Terrorism and Organized Crime by Bossong, Raphael
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities 
A project co-funded by the University of Essex and  
the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union 
Online paper series, Spring/Summer 2017 
 
 
EU-Japan / Fight against Terrorism and Organized Crime  
Raphael Bossong, Berlin 
 
1. Threat perception 
The fight against international terrorism and organized crime has been one of the central concerns of 
European security cooperation for decades. In the 1970s, the so-called TREVI group of European 
Ministers of Interior formed in response to a wave of terrorist attacks and came to constitute the 
political nucleus for the later EU cooperation in police and criminal justice matters. Ever since the 
1990s, the expansion of globalization was shadowed by the growth and diversification of organized 
crime groups. The range of potential criminal activities is vast, ranging from drug, arms and human 
trafficking
1
 to more “subtle” but highly damaging forms of economic crime, such as VAT fraud, money 
laundering, match fixing, product piracy and counterfeiting, and smuggling of cigarettes, endangered 
species or animal products. In the mid-1990s, the perceived threat from organized crime (especially 
its central role in drug trafficking) triggered the creation of EUROPOL, whereas the very first EU 
action plan in the area of internal security from 1998 focused on organized crime (Council Action Plan 
15/08/1997), which has been followed by regularly revised strategic documents on human and drugs 
trafficking (Council of the European Union, 2012; European Commission COM (2012) 286).  
The period between September 11, 2001 and the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004-5 then 
served as formative period for the EU’s expanding role in all aspects of internal security. As early as 
2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) provided a nuanced as well as urgent threat assessment 
by arguing that Europe “is both a target and a base for this Terrorism" and that the radicalization of 
young migrants is possible due to “modernization pressure, cultural, social and political crises as well 
as the alienation of the young people living in foreign societies" (European Security Strategy, 2003). 
The 2010 EU Internal Security (Council of the European Union 5842/2/10), similarly listed terrorism 
and organized crime as the first two main threats, followed by the closely related threats of cybercrime 
and cross-border crime. This and many other sector specific strategies on phenomena such as the 
financing of terrorism or radicalisation are flanked by annual reports by EUROPOL on the threat of 
terrorism and ‘serious and organized crime’ in Europe, the so-called Te-Sat and SOCTA reports 
(EUROPOL 2013a, 2013b).
2
 In the area of organized crime Europol has increasingly published 
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 Including new synthetic drugs or illegal ‘slave labour’ in European textile workshops 
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 Both reports are flagship products of EUROPOL that seek to demonstrate the analytical value of the institutions 
to member states. As such, these annual strategic reports have been subject to intense debates and may, at 
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headline-catching figures that underlined the seriousness of the threat. For instance, it estimated that 
3,600 organized crime groups were active in Europe (EUROPOL 2013c), or claimed that different 
forms of organized crime had a negative economic impact in the region of double-digit billions of 
Euros (Wainwright 2013).  
Between 2007 and 2012, however, terrorism receded from the agenda, with the EU Counterterrorism 
Coordinator complaining about lacking implementation and “terrorism fatigue” among the member 
states, whereas the public was – seen on average across all member states – largely unconcerned. 
According to the Eurobarometer's public opinion poll, around 2 per cent of the European population in 
2012 categorized terrorism as one of the EU's two most important issues. Threat perceptions 
changed again dramatically with the rise of so-called Islamic State (IS) since 2013. The first terrorist 
attack in Europe, apparently committed by a Syrian returnee, took place on 24 May 2014, when the 
French national Mehdi Nemmouche shot four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. The two 
major attacks in Paris in February and November 2015 then tragically underlined the seriousness of 
the threat. An internal paper by Europol drawn up quickly after the second Paris attacks considered 
the overall constellation of high attraction to IS, returnees to Europe and the intersection with the 
migration crisis as the “most serious terror threat Europe has faced for over 10 years” (Council of the 
European Union 14244/15). This was sadly confirmed in 2016 with three further severe attacks in 
Brussels, Nice and Berlin. 
These tragic events intersected with the major refugee crisis in Europe, which became in many 
European national publics enmeshed with threat perceptions about terrorism. While various security 
authorities have been arguing against conflating these concerns too directly, it has been estimated 
that at least several dozen IS operatives had made their way back to Europe in the context of the 
refugee crisis (Chulov 2016; Gaouette et al. 2016; Hinnant and Dodds 2016). Recently, military 
successes against IS may have ended the flow of recruits to Syria and Iraq, but even further raised 
the worry that terrorism by returnees will be used as the remaining tactic of choice against Western 
countries (EUROPOL 2016b). Particularly in France, the fear of further attacks has been extremely 
elevated and led to repeated extensions of the state of emergency (AFP 2016). But also other 
European countries have undergone an increasing upward convergence of threat perceptions, which 
stimulated new initiatives to cooperate in the fight against terrorism (see further below). A related 
recent trend for convergence has been the connection between terrorism and organized crime, the 
so-called crime-terror nexus, which has been increasingly evidenced in the latest wave of Jihadi 
terrorism in Europe (Clarke 2016). In particular, a considerable proportion of foreign terrorist fighters 
(FTF), but also of other radicalized individuals still inside European member states have a criminal 
record and are involved in petty crime. For European security actors this underlines the need to move 
on parallel fronts and use policy instruments, especially to trace and to control illicit funds, both for the 
fight against organized crime and against terrorism.  
 
2. EU internal (domestic) response 
In light of the centrality of organized crime and terrorism to EU internal security cooperation as a 
whole, it is virtually impossible to provide a survey of all major EU instruments that have been 
associated with these threats, and which would provide a full ‘baseline’ for current developments. For 
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instance, the EU original Action Plan on Combating Terrorism
3
, contained more than 170 items 
(Bossong 2008), whereas a comprehensive stock taken from 2013 counted more than 239 EU 
measures since 2001 – while also harshly criticising the often limited relevance of many measures to 
the declared central objectives of countering international terrorism (Statewatch n.d.). The range of 
more issue specific and historically accumulated documents on organized crime and terrorism 
surveyed above do not offer much insight either. For instance, the 2005 EU counterterrorism strategy 
contains four broad objectives, namely prevention, pursuit of terrorists, preparedness to defend 
against attacks and response measures in the aftermath, such as victim support. Thus, the EU 
typically tends to be as comprehensive as possible, without a clear sense of priority. The relevance of 
the various EU security strategies to political practice has also regularly been doubted (Coolsaet 
2010; Schroeder 2011).  
Instead, one can sketch out five broad trends or patterns in the EU’s response to organized crime and 
terrorism. First, the starting point is that the EU cannot act directly against terrorism and organized 
crime groups. Arrests and the conduct of concrete security measures remain strictly with each of the 
member states. As put in Art.4 (2) TEU and Art.72 (and 73) TFEU, member states remain free to 
define the exercise of their national competences in this regard. At most, national security staff are 
borrowed or united under EU instruments and frameworks, such as rapid intervention teams at 
borders. So even the most operational aspects of EU internal security cooperation, namely the 
activities of the growing JHA agencies EUROPOL, EUROJUST (and FRONTEX), remain centred on 
the collection and exchange of information with national authorities. This is not to underestimate the 
power and importance of such information-driven approaches to internal security provision. 
EUROPOL opened a new counterterrorism centre in 2016, which significantly boosted intelligence 
exchanges, while both EUROPOL and FRONTEX have been given supportive roles in the security 
screening of refugees arriving to hotspots in Greece and Italy. EU has also made considerable 
physical investments into data networks and databases, both of a centralised and decentralised kind, 
ranging from the long-standing Schengen Information System to more recent agreements on how to 
exchange DNA data or all other forms of police information via IT infrastructures that are coordinated 
by EU agencies (Council of the European Union 9368/1/16).  
Second, the EU traditionally underlines the need to respect ‘the Rule of Law’ in countering the threats 
of organized crime and terrorism, while the meaning of this approach remains dependent on national 
legal systems that are only partially made compatible with each other. As a wider policy objective, the 
EU committed to creating the so-called Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which is now even 
mentioned before the Single Market as a core objective of the European integration process (Art. 3(2) 
TEU). The main thrust of EU initiatives has been to facilitate and speed up mutual legal assistance 
and cooperation across borders and to create so-called mutual trusts among the diverse legal 
systems in European member states. The underlying principle is the so-called mutual recognition of 
different national legal systems (Nilsson 2006), whereas a genuinely common body of EU criminal law 
remains elusive. The most notable step has been the so-called European Arrest Warrant, which 
should allow national criminal justice authorities to request the arrest and extradition of suspects 
without political interventions. Still, the creation of legal trust across the member states to underpin 
effective mutual recognition remains complex and ridden with conflicts (Block 2011, Peers 2013), so 
that in many cases expectations for cooperation based on pragmatism and minimal shared standards 
are not borne out in practice.   
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 Though probably unnecessarily inflated, the Action Plan served as the most comprehensive definition of the 
EU’s operational and legislative measures in this area. 
Bossong // EU-Japan / Terrorism and Organised Crime  EU-Japan Security Cooperation online paper 
4 
 
In recent times, however, these questions of trust, general patterns of transnational cooperation 
between police and justice authorities, or general principles of mutual recognition and the architecture 
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice have receded from the political agenda. Instead, the 
focus is now placed on more specific indicators for operational coordination in respect to key threats, 
such as the number of persons that are entered into EU-wide terrorist watch lists. Furthermore, one 
can see a steady adaptation and hardening of EU legislation for specific problems in the prosecution 
of terrorism and organized crime. The latest revision of the EU directive on combating terrorism that 
seeks to ensure a more consistent criminalisation of travel to areas that can be construed as support 
of, or seeking training from, terrorist organisations (European Commission 2015b). But this legal 
hardening in specific fields also comes hand in hand with a trend of increasing criminalisation of 
‘preparatory acts’ or general ‘association’ with criminal or terrorist groups that fall short of 
conventional standards of the rule of law – highlighting clearly defined criminal acts and the 
presumption of innocence. This is a wider trend in Western criminal law that has not been pioneered, 
but also supported rather than resisted by the EU.  
Third, the EU’s increasingly hard edge in the fight against terrorism and organized crime has 
manifested itself most clearly in the area of financial sanctions, where the EU can build on its 
entrenched market power and competences as an economic regulator. One of the most controversial 
components of the EU’s fight against terrorism since 9/11 has been the freezing of terrorist assets, as 
originally required by the UN Security Council (de Goede 2011), but evolved over time into an 
increasingly independent EU sanctioning mechanism. More widely, the EU has long been very active 
to address issues of financial transparency, regulation and control that are associated with both the 
fight against terrorism and organized crime (e.g. the FATF) (Brzoska 2011). Recent policy 
developments continue this long-standing trajectory irrespective of shifting strategic security 
discourses. One could even argue that the control of financial transactions constitutes for 
considerable time already a genuinely supra-nationalised component of the Commission agenda on 
internal security. In February 2016 the Commission issued a renewed action plan on combating the 
terrorist financing (European Commission 2016, 50). Among several legislative amendments to rules 
on money laundering, it also pushed towards more financial intelligence exchange and further 
cooperation with third countries, all of which serve multiple purposes in the fight against organized 
crime alongside terrorism. Meanwhile, the exchange of financial intelligence with the US under the so-
called Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, which is managed by EUROPOL, has been cited as 
the central contribution of the EU to the investigation of the network of the terrorist cell that struck 
Paris in November 2015. As a final measure the Commission is currently reviewing the options for a 
system of sanctioning terrorist suspects without international connections that are necessary under 
the current regime (European Commission 2015a). 
Fourth, a relatively new or resurgent trend in the EU’s response to terrorism is the renewed emphasis 
on border security, which results from the intersection of recent attacks with the refugee crisis. While 
the US has long sought to defend itself from international terrorism by ever more stringent border 
control measures, this has typically been regarded as impossible in Europe due to more open and 
(geographically) diverse borders in the Schengen area. Furthermore, until a few years ago the most 
serious threats emerged from within the member states and radicalized nationals rather than 
international terrorist attackers. The rise of foreign travelling fighters since 2013 has changed this 
assessment, so that the EU’s strong competences for harmonizing border controls are now reapplied 
to identifying these travel movements, screening refugee flows and preventing possible returns. Thus 
in 2016, the EU agreed after a decade of discussions on a European system for the collection and 
analysis of Passenger Name Records on international flights – a system which the US already 
installed in 2003, followed by many other OECD countries. Further proposals for enhanced biometric 
registration, ‘smart’ technological border controls, and a screening of visa-free travellers to the EU are 
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currently being discussed and are likely to be approved in the near future, even if operational 
implementation may still take many years.  
Finally, the EU has sought to position itself as a core platform for ‘softer’ forms of learning and 
operational coordination in different thematic fields of internal security (Bossong 2012). Such soft 
governance initiatives are aiming to sidestep both limited legal competences and to support such trust 
building for more voluntary cooperation. For instance, the EU sponsors a network on the prevention of 
crime, the terrorism-related ‘radicalization awareness network’ RAN) and a multiplicity of other expert 
groups with related expertise to aspects of terrorism and organized crime.
4
 The RAN network in 
particular has become an ever more publicised and well-funded part of the EU’s counterterrorism 
agenda, even if it remains challenging to move from general best practice exchanges to a wide 
diffusion and reform of practices of ground-level staff from police as well as social services across 
many member states. There are also more operational initiatives to synchronise the priorities of 
national police and border agencies, such as by simultaneous, if nationally independent actions 
against certain forms of organized crime under the so-called ‘policy cycle’.  
 
3. International actions of the EU 
Ever since 9/11, the EU sought to integrate the fight against terrorism into its wide array of diplomatic 
activities, partnership agreements (especially in the EU’s neighbourhood) and some external financial 
assistance programs (Brattberg and Rhinard 2012, Kaunert 2012). However, until the early 2010s, 
this largely remained at the level of diplomatic declarations and general clauses in EU partnership 
agreements, which in itself had little force or impact.  
Yet, the so-called ‘external dimension’ of the EU’s cooperation in matters of internal security, which 
also includes the fight against organized crime and illegal migration, grew dynamically since the mid-
2000s (Carrapico 2013, Monar 2013). EU-US cooperation has been at the forefront, ranging from 
general mutual legal assistance, the exchange of various forms of data for the analysis of security 
agencies (SWIFT financial intelligence, PNR) to consultations on emerging legal frameworks in areas 
such as cybersecurity and counter-radicalisation. Most recently, the European Parliament acceded to 
a new EU-US framework agreement on data protection, which includes information-sharing for 
security purposes, which had previously been a major obstacle in this relationship. At the same time, 
the EU has sought to exercise external governance on internal security concerns over its immediate 
neighbourhood and some African states, which are seen as originators, safe havens or transit 
corridors for terrorism and organized crime. Particularly states that continue to seek EU membership 
and close association, such as in the Western Balkans, have been receptive and could be motivated 
for intensified information-exchange with EU partners (Council of the European Union 13887/15). But 
the EU developed a wider range of partnerships and cooperation agreements with third countries 
around the world to address different aspects of drugs and human trafficking (Renard 2014). 
Against this background, the EU is typically seen as a strong supporter of multilateral frameworks for 
cooperation in international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and UN, be it in 
the case of the fight against terrorism (Wouters and Duquet 2013) or against drug trafficking 
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 For instance, the ATLAS network of special intervention units, the informal network of contact points on the 
administrative approach to prevent and fight organised crime, the Explosives Security Experts Task Force, etc. 
An current official EU list can be found at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st09/st09407-
re01.en13.pdf 
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(EMCDDA, n.d.). The EU also aimed to provide a contribution to international peace and stability by 
fielding civilian crisis missions in the Western Balkans, Africa and parts of the Middle East and Central 
Asia that should support, among other objectives, the Rule of Law and the fight against organized 
crime and terrorism.  
While many of these contributions and missions have not had the desired impact, recent years have 
seen an intensification of efforts. In 2012, the EU and the new External Action Service sought to 
design more integrated strategies to the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, which included the fight against 
terrorism and organized crime as prominent objectives – also reflected in the mandates of the EU 
missions in Mali (EUTM Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). At the same time, the EU Antiterrorism 
Coordinator promoted a more operational agenda for global cooperation. This included, for example, 
regular dialogues on questions of radicalization or the control of terrorist financing with Gulf States. 
These efforts further intensified after the Arab Spring and the subsequent concern with foreign 
fighters, leading to ‘high-level dialogues’ on counterterrorism with Maghreb states. Under the aegis of 
the new High Representative Mogherini, capacity building packages were launched in Tunisia, Jordan 
and Lebanon, each of which comprised a financial volume between 30 to 35m Euro. This 
complements EU regional programs to spread counter-narratives and security sector reform, which 
may indirectly contain terrorist support.  
Yet, it must also be noted that the EU’s response to the war in Syria and the military campaign 
against ISIL remains highly constrained and mostly focused on the provision of financial assistance 
and humanitarian aid. The EU strategy for Iraq and Da’esh promised approximately EUR 1.7 billion, in 
addition to 2.4 billion raised at the international donor conference in February 2016. Despite this 
growing financial commitment, key diplomatic negotiations on the conflict took place without the EU. 
Moreover, the overriding concern of the EU to limit refugee flows from the conflicts in Syria, 
Afghanistan or Libya undermined its internal cohesion and allowed third countries, such as Turkey, to 
prioritise its own regional security policy objectives. Even if operational cooperation in the fight against 
foreign terrorist fighters and different terrorist grouping eventually picked up between various EU 
member states and key third states, it represents another missed opportunity, or even major set-back 
for the EU’s international role in the fight against terrorism.  
 
4. EU-Japan cooperation 
Despite the absence of Islamic terrorism within Japan, it has a somewhat comparable historical 
experience of left-wing extremist terrorism, or the Japanese Red Army Faction, which was also 
internationally active (O’Connell 2015). In the 1990s, the sarin attack by the Aum sect still constitutes 
the only major terrorist WMD attack until today, and served at the time already as inspiration for many 
pessimistic threat scenarios by terrorist experts around the globe. Furthermore, organized crime is a 
historically entrenched phenomenon in Japan as well as in various, if not all, parts of the EU. In 
particular, the ‘Yakuza’ has been widely known alongside the Italian mafia, even if new groups, such 
as the ‘Russian mafia’ may have grown more dynamically over the last two decades (Galeotti 2005 // 
2014). While the respective international reach and impact of different organized crime groups remain 
contested, with Japanese groups possibly less inclined to operate abroad than may be assumed 
(Varese 2011), the general public and political awareness of organized crime remains comparatively 
high in Japan.  
These parallels, though not necessarily overlaps, in threat perceptions provide the basis for EU-Japan 
security relations and cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Generally 
speaking, EU-Japan exchanges on security issues build on a long, intense engagement since the 
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1970s as major trading powers (Keck et al. 2013; Watanabe 2013) and members of the wider 
‘Western’ or US-led international order (Frontini 2016; Grajewski 2016). The fundamental motivation 
for subsequent cooperation on security issues since the end of the Cold War is shared historical and 
rhetorical commitment to global stability and peace, as well as the liberal institutional order led by the 
UN (European Commission 2015). The constitutional limitations for Japan’s non-military stance 
remained in place, but chimed with many European member states (especially Germany) and the 
then entrenched discourse of the EU as a civilian power.  
Japan, as a major economic power, also developed major stakes in global financial stability and 
related initiatives for controlling illicit flows. This triggered increasing exchanges with the EU on 
questions of money laundering, but also financial sanctions that were advanced in the UN. The 
overlapping membership in the G7 has been particularly important for European-Japanese 
interactions on these topics. The G7 initiated the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) already in 1989, 
from which it would develop into a central network for global efforts to combat illicit finance over two 
decades. Building on this, the Egmont, among related ‘financial intelligence units’, focuses on the fight 
against terrorist financing.
5
 In addition, a further spin-off network among the G7 is the so-called Dublin 
group, which deals with drug trafficking on a regular basis since 1990 (EURAD 2014; McDonough and 
Deflem n.d.). 
In 2001, the tenth anniversary of the new EU-Japan cooperation coincided with the global response to 
international terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2001). This conjuncture led to dedicated 
declaration on combating terrorism alongside the first EU Japan Action Plan (de Boer 2002), which 
otherwise included various concerns in the fight against organized crime, such as money laundering 
or various forms of illicit trafficking among many other economic, scientific and cultural policy 
objectives. While the action plan may be criticized as an overly long ‘shopping list’ with a lack of 
prioritization or jointly felt need for urgent action (Berkofsky n.d.), the concern with terrorism remained 
on the diplomatic agenda: due to its alliance with the US and increasing military engagement since 
the second Gulf War, Japan became subject of terrorist threats by Al Qaida since 2003. This became 
the basis for regular political exchanges and declarations of the EU and Japan on the shared 
challenge to address terrorism in order to preserve international peace and stability (Mykal 2011). The 
core of these activities revolved around mutual support for the UN and its diverse efforts to contain 
international terrorism by UNSC resolutions, peace operations and by assistance and capacity-
building for vulnerable countries. Japan also invested in numerous regional Asian formats, such as 
ASEAN, or provided support to specifically vulnerable countries, such as Afghanistan, to contain 
terrorism. At the same time, Japan also became one of the first international partners for EUROPOL. 
The 2001 Action Plan included further topics of organized crime, in particular human, arms and drugs 
trafficking. Yet this did not lead to noticeable shared activities, not least as EUROPOL was also still a 
nascent organization within the EU.  
In 2009, the EU and Japan signed an Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) which entered 
into force early 2011. The aim of the agreement was to facilitate cooperation in the area of mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters. As overall numbers of requests for legal assistance increased 
significantly, one can conclude that the agreement was relatively effective (Council of the European 
Union 15008/16) to enhance cooperation in the field. Eurojust, which is the EU institution tasked 
responsible to facilitate such requests, however, has not commonly been involved, as the MLA allows 
for direct cooperation between member states and Japan. There is no cooperation agreement 
                                                          
5
 See http://www.egmontgroup.org/ 
Bossong // EU-Japan / Terrorism and Organised Crime  EU-Japan Security Cooperation online paper 
8 
 
between Eurojust and Japan, but contact points have been established to facilitate better cooperation 
(Council of the European Union 6417/15). 
In the 2010s, EU-Japan cooperation then renewed the shared focus on economic development and 
scientific exchanges under the impression of the global financial crisis and the Fukushima disaster. 
Nevertheless, some new developments in the shared fight against terrorism financing and also new 
initiatives to address counterfeiting could be advanced. On a bilateral level, the technological 
knowhow and eagerness to implement new technologies drives further exchanges, such as on 
biometric border controls, data exchanges for security purposes or more generally the securing of 
cyberspace, which also touches upon the fight against terrorism and organized crime. In the last few 
years, the EU’s efforts to combat cybercrime – particularly through the formation of the EC3 centre at 
EUROPOL – have also touched upon Japan, or even led to isolated cases of direct cooperation 
(EUROPOL 2016a). Yet, cooperation between EUROPOL and Japan reached neither the level of a 
strategic nor an operational agreement. 
Most recently, the rise of ISIL since 2013 attracted few Japanese fighters, whereas in 2015 two 
Japanese reporters in Syria were held hostage and ultimately executed by ISIL (Counter Extremism 
Project n.d.). The rise of ISIL nevertheless underlined the shared concern of Japan and the EU to 
address process of radicalization (Counter Extremism Project n.d.), which constitutes another area of 
cooperation in the framework of the UN. Overall, however, it seems that EU-Japan cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism remains mostly centred on wider diplomatic and financial support for 
international peace and stability than specific measures to target certain groups (at risk of 
radicalization, or travelling fighters).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Increased cooperation in matters of internal security, which is intimately connected to the fight against 
terrorism and organized crime, has been one of the main developments of EU integration over the last 
two decades. Yet although the EU is clearly the most advanced regional organisation in this issue 
area, where national sovereignty concerns typically obstruct more than informal or ad hoc 
cooperation, it can hardly be treated as a coherent actor in the fight against terrorism and organized 
crime. The EU and its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice are still made up by an incoherent 
amalgam of data and information networks for criminal justice information, EU-level agencies for 
analysis and coordination (but not direct executive action and prosecution) and national criminal 
justice systems that are only made partially compatible with each other. In so far as the EU has 
acquired a distinct profile, it arguably progressed best in the areas of financial aspects of the fight 
against organized crime and terrorism, flanked by increasing efforts for border security, information-
sharing and screening of travel movements to intercept foreign terrorist fighters.  
Cooperation on internal security has repeatedly emerged as a pressing political priority, to respond to 
immediate crises, but also to underline the concrete benefit of the EU to citizens. Over the last two 
years, an increasing number of national political actors have come to highlight internal security as a 
key objective for maintaining the legitimacy of the Union, or at least to maintain the central value of 
freedom of movement and the popular achievements of Schengen. However, it is also clear that 
during a time of rising Euroscepticism and in the wake of the Brexit shock expressively supranational 
conceptions for intensified cooperation, even in such seemingly popular areas such as internal 
security, have been met with an ever higher degree of scepticism than in the past.  
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International cooperation on organized crime and terrorism needs to reflect on this complex state of 
affairs, and also be aware of the multiplicity of venues for security cooperation, be they of a bilateral 
(liaison officers) or multilateral kind (e.g. in the UN). In very broad terms, EU-Japan security relations 
benefit from shared norms, and in part also shared threat perceptions. The question is rather in how 
far tangible cooperation benefits and projects can be realized in different global formats, or whether 
alternative domestic priorities and more immediate concerns with threats in the respective 
neighbourhoods (Raine and Small 2015; Sakaki 2015) of the EU and Japan overlay the possible 
cooperation on organized crime and terrorism. 
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